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. Robinson LADB news analyst Nicaragua's Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) will hold
its first national party congress in July, 12 years after it overthrew the Somoza dictatorship and 17
months after being voted out of power. The FSLN suffered a stunning defeat in the February 1990
elections. The setback, coming after 20 years of guerrilla struggle, over 10 years in power, and a
decade of resistance to US intervention, was unexpected by most Sandinistas and opponents alike.
The election results threw the organization into a crisis, and engendered a process of collective
reflection on dogmas of the past and challenges of the future. The 50,000-member Front captured
over 40% of the 1.5 million votes cast in the elections, making it not only the principal political
force in Nicaragua, but also after the Cuban Communist Party, and possibly the Brazilian Workers
Party the largest and best-coordinated leftist organization in Latin America. During their decade
in power, the Sandinistas implemented a unique revolutionary program which captured the
imagination of the international community and placed them at the forefront of a new generation of
revolutionaries in Latin America, described by some as the "new left." The election defeat unleashed
a lively and at times fierce debate among FSLN members on its causes, and alternative current
and future directions for the organization. In June 1990 several hundred party militants convened
at El Crucero for 72 hours of round-the-clock discussion. The "Crucero Document" indicated that
US intervention, international circumstances, and the FSLN's internal organizational and political
weaknesses were the conjunctural causes of the defeat. Settling arguments over the past, the debate
moved on to where the FSLN should be headed. The Crucero Document also affirmed that through
the 1990 elections the Sandinistas had been successful in transferring the conflict in Nicaragua
from the military to political terrain. The challenge facing the Sandinistas, it said, is to defend
the gains won via the revolution, to recover that portion of its social base lost in a decade of warinduced attrition, to recover majority consensus around its political and economic platform as the
best viable alternative for Nicaragua, and to regain government power in the 1996 elections. No
longer responsible for administering the government, the Sandinistas are now developing their
skills as a legal, mass opposition political movement and party. The locus of the FSLN's activity
has shifted from the state to civil society, something many observers would consider a positive
development independent of whether the Sandinistas are in or out of government. Involved here
are two interrelated processes: internal democratization, and renovation of the Sandinista program,
outlook, tactics and alliances adequate to meet changed domestic and international circumstances.
In effect, the FSLN is attempting to hammer out a new paradigm for revolutionary struggle in Latin
America. The FSLN was founded in 1961 by a group of revolutionaries who were inspired by the
Cuban revolution, and disaffected with the traditional Nicaraguan Socialist (Communist) party. The
secret to the Sandinistas' success, where other revolutionary movements had failed in the 1960s
and 1970s, was grounding their struggle in Nicaragua's history and circumstances, "updating"
the anti-imperialist struggle of Augusto C. Sandino 50 years earlier, and creatively synthesizing
nationalism with marxism and liberation theology. The Sandinista nationalist programme of mixed
economy, political pluralism, non-alignment, and a combination of revolutionary and participatory
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democracy, was a novel departure from orthodox revolutions and one which the US worked hard
at delegitimizing in order to rationalize its aggressive policies. The FSLN programme is considered
realistic by progressive persons in Nicaragua and elsewhere, given current global conditions under
which sovereign nations can pursue the simultaneous goals of development and social justice. The
programme is a framework for managing scarce resources in multi-class societies toward promoting
international competition and economic development in favor of both accumulation and more
equitable distribution. The broader backdrop or reference point for the redefinition of the FSLN
and the party's programme for Nicaragua is the development of new organizational structures and
political visions for the Latin American new left's struggle during the 1990s. The most prominent
representatives of the new left at present are Brazil's Workers Party, the M-19 party in Colombia,
Uruguay's Broad Front and the Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. Party
democratization The debate raging within the Sandinista rank and file, and among the party's
sympathizers, has renewed the democratic vibrancy of Sandinismo. The FSLN emerged from two
decades of underground guerrilla struggle in 1979, but never had the chance to shed the structures
of internal organization which originated in underground operations, and to make the transition
to a modern political party functioning under conditions of civic or electoral struggle. In early 1981,
the Reagan administration effectively declared war on Nicaragua. The Sandinistas were forced to
organize and lead a national defense campaign conducive to maintaining centralization of power,
command-oriented political behavior, and the stifling of internal democracy. Many Sandinistas have
concluded, in retrospect, that the lack of internal democracy contributed to the electoral defeat by
undermining the organization's capacity to face the consequences erosion of the revolution's social
base of sustained external aggression. Internal democratization began in 1990 with the election of
new local authorities and a reorganization of party structures throughout the country. This process
involved transformation of party structures from top-down to bottom-up through local, area (zone),
and regional party elections. The next step in the democratic reorganization will be the election
of new national leadership. Debate is focused less on which leaders should remain and which
should be replaced, than on how leadership structure should be organized. Some party members
and supporters have argued in favor of maintaining the current form of collective leadership in
a national directorate. Others have proposed expansion of the directorate from the current nine
to more members, while still others have argued in favor of a more traditional party structure or
one headed by a secretary or president. Many insist that women who comprise a large proportion,
if not the majority, of overall membership and intermediate and base level leadership must be
brought into national leadership positions. Another option concerns change in the leadership, or
whether an elected national party congress whose members can be recalled should be the party's
maximum authority. Creation of such a congress would reduce a national directorate or a secretary
to an advisory role. Behind these alternative proposals is the issue of flexible, democratic party
organization which permits the leadership, regardless of its structure or form, to be responsive and
accountable to the party base. The leadership would simultaneously be able to clearly articulate
the organization's program, and the interests of a mass membership and social base. A total of 500
locally-elected delegates will take part in the national congress, scheduled for July 19-21. The event
is divided into three phases. Between March and May during "grass roots discussion," position
papers and issues are debated in local and district meetings. Members participating in these
meetings are to elect representatives to participate in nine provincial congresses set for June. The
final phase is the national congress July. A declaration of purpose for the congress describes it as "a
democratic process through which all Sandinistas may discuss and approve the basic documents
which guide our party's life and may elect its authorities." Some of the complex questions under
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consideration by the FSLN rank and file which, in fact, form an agenda for the new left in Latin
America are outlined below. * Should the FSLN be a mass party or a party of cadres? What is the
nature of the relationship between the FSLN as party, and the social movements it is attempting
to lead? What should be the balance between electoral activity and mass organization? Party
militant, poet and novelist Gioconda Belli recently commented: "The current co-existence within the
FSLN of traits belonging to a front, single party, guerrilla organization, party of cadres, vanguard
unity and electoral party, results, in fact, in an amalgam of confusion. [This situation] in practice
hinders the exercise of politics and impedes coherent action...[It is necessary to] define a structure
which enables us to exist as an electoral party without divorcing ourselves from our nature as a
class [based] party." * How pluralist should the FSLN be, and how rigorously should it represent
popular sector interests over the interests of the nation as a whole? Should the FSLN claim to
represent workers' class-based interests? Or should the party attempt to represent the broadest
possible consensus in society? Where does the FSLN "draw lines" on sectoral representation?
Underlying this discussion is the issue of how to articulate majority socio-political alliances. Some
Sandinistas, such as the controversial National Assembly member Rafael Solis, have stressed the
multi-class character of the organization. Solis says that the Sandinista Front "was never a workers
and peasants party, but also incorporated petty bourgeois and bourgeois (sectors)...[C]lass struggle
in Nicaragua no longer makes sense." Long-time militant Luis Enrique Figueroa maintains that
the FSLN should open its doors to all who support its program. However, says Figueroa, "I am
convinced the bourgeoisie, as a class, will never be a natural ally of the FSLN. To the contrary,
it will try to prevent us from achieving our objectives." * Does anti-imperialism, or resistance to
traditional US domination, still have a role in the Sandinista programme? The question was raised
following last year's elections, on the heels of an frequently quoted statement by Victor Tirado
Lopez, a member of the current national directorate. Tirado said, "The cycle of anti-imperialist
revolutions in the Third World have come to an end" in the 1990s. There is consensus in the FSLN
that the cost of all-out confrontation with the US and its historic domination is unacceptably high.
Therefore, how does Nicaragua defend political sovereignty and struggle for greater economic
autonomy, while also managing to co-exist with the US? Asked in a recent interview how this
issue may be dealt with at the National Congress, another member of the national directorate, Luis
Carrion, said: "Nicaragua's road to happiness depends on the exercise of full national sovereignty.
Anti-imperialism will only cease to be valid when imperialism has stopped being imperialism,
when the United States changes relations with the American continent, stops imposing its political
will on our peoples, and permits us to seek and find our own way. [Although] this does not mean
being at permanent war as long as US imperialism exists, anti-imperialism is the other side of the
commitment we have to Nicaragua's sovereignty." * What kind of economic model is viable for
small, underdeveloped and peripheral economies like Nicaragua, given no alternative other than
insertion into to the capitalist world market and US economic hegemony in the region? Are there
options other than the neo-liberal economic restructuring schemes? As a frame of reference, most
Sandinistas agree on a mixed economy, an active role for the government in the national economy,
and efforts toward regional economic integration and greater justice in international economic
relations. Rafael Solis maintains that "in Nicaragua we have to promote the development of a
capitalism with new ingredients..., less medieval than it was before 1979." * What are the strategic
relations the FSLN should develop within the international community? Should the FSLN accept the
invitation to join the Socialist International? What is the distinction, if any, between a revolutionary
program and a social democratic program? * How should the FSLN exercise opposition and at the
same time contribute to political reconciliation, and economic stabilization and recovery? The push©2011 The University of New Mexico,
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pull tendencies regarding support and opposition for the Chamorro government has produced
diverse arguments. Solis and others assert that the FSLN should co-govern. Carlos Fonseca Teran,
son of the FSLN's founder Carlos Fonseca Amador, insists that co-government is a trap set by the
Nicaraguan bourgeoisie to coopt the interests of the popular classes. From ideology to politics
Former deputy foreign minister Victor Hugo Tinoco, who represented Nicaragua in the Contadora
and Esquipulas peace negotiations, recently referred to a "shift in the Latin American left from
ideology to politics." According to Tinoco, "The most recent phenomenon in Central America
already developed in other parts of Latin America is the tendency to substitute ideology with
politics. The decline of ideology, as dogma or catechism giving sole explanation to the world, life
and events, opens the way for politics and political objectives as the matrix for uniting protagonists
and articulating the political action of distinct groups. "In this sense, political groups who, on the
one side, represent marginality and poverty, and on the other side, privilege and wealth, have
concrete and contrasting interests which each will pursue...[These groups] have not disappeared
with the Berlin Wall or the socialist bloc. However, the junctions between these distinct interests
are now expressed less through dichotomous schemes or ideologies which draw societal divides,
than through the contradictions between concrete policies and goals of different groups. This is the
harbinger of political struggle, not only in Central America, but also for all of Latin America." In
Nicaragua, the Sandinistas face a fluid and constantly changing post-electoral reality. The severe
social and economic crisis has fueled an environment of class antagonism, popular struggles and
political tensions. Social polarization and crisis have in turn placed pressures on the FSLN and
its process of redefinition. Although the Sandinistas lost the government in the February 1990
elections, the electoral process itself was carried out within the institutionality developed by the
revolution. Presidency Minister Antonio Lacayo, President Chamorro's closest adviser and de facto
prime minister, has pointed out to his adversaries on the right that the UNO victory was a electoral
rotation of power, and not a social revolution nor a change in the state apparatus. This means that
the locus of operation for the Sandinistas and members of the UNO coalition alike is the legal and
institutional framework developed under the revolution. If anything threatens to result in division
among the Sandinistas it is polarization around two views. One perspective holds that the FSLN
must focus on defending democracy, legality and the established institutional framework. The other
perspective argues that the Frente must defend the social gains of the revolution. The first requires
compromise, schemes for alliances and collegiate governance, and the search for societal consensus.
The second involves mass mobilizations around popular interests. No one among the Sandinistas
advocates destabilizing the current government, and all agree that revolutionary struggle now
means peaceful mobilization, political contestation, and electoral competition. In El Salvador,
for instance, organizations representing a significant proportion of the population argue that
existing political and juridical structures must be transformed before contestation can be effective
in the strictly institutional arena. In Nicaragua, however, a consensus has been established on the
following: state and society have been broadened and democratized in 10 years of revolution to the
point where existing institutionality provides acceptable parameters for all social sectors to pursue
respective interests. This situation has nonetheless given rise to a contradiction among Sandinistas
between the impulse to defend the existing institutionality, and to defend popular and revolutionary
gains even when the latter imposes strain on the institutional prerogative. As Sandinista analyst
Aldo Diaz Lacayo, put it: "The impact of the electoral defeat within the context of global changes has
apparently produced among the Sandinista membership an unconscious regression to Sandinismo's
two ideological currents, and is acting on them as an uncontrollable centrifugal force...One of these
maintains that it is necessary to prioritize democracy in order to save the revolutionary process.
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The other asserts that the first priority is to defend social achievements in order to preserve the
revolution... "Besides being different political aspects of the same ideological parent, both positions,
considered individually are false: the first because it supposes the existence of an option other
than democracy, and the second because it takes as a given the people's supposed indifference
to revolutionary achievements...But democracy does not exclude the people's struggle which the
revolution encourages and demands...[C]onfrontation between these two categories makes no sense.
The appropriate thing to do is struggle for democracy in the revolution, or, as some prefer..., for
a democratic revolution." There have been frequent differences, in fact, in political positions as
articulated by militant trade union and popular organizations, such as the National Workers Front
(FNT), and the political leadership of the FSLN. Some observers on the right say such differences
symptomatic of imminent splits. For instance, the FSLN cautiously approved the economic "shock"
treatment measures announced by the government in early March, while the FNT condemned the
program as anti-worker. In part, the backdrop to such diverse positions is the duality mentioned by
Aldo Diaz Lacayo preserving democracy versus defending social gains. Another dimension of the
backdrop is precisely what Victor Hugo Tinoco meant by substituting concrete political struggle for
ideological dogma. Workers will defend their interests, which are hurt by neo-liberal adjustment
schemes. A revolutionary political party will adopt a broader, longer-term vision of social interests,
objective conditions and required sacrifices. The FSLN congress will not resolve all the complex
and thorny issues on the Sandinista agenda. It will constitute a departure point for focusing on and
addressing them. While many of these concerns are unique in some ways to Nicaragua, they also
reflect an urgent agenda for all of Latin America.

-- End --
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